The property rights approach to the theory of the …rm is the most prominent application of the incomplete contracting paradigm. A central conclusion of the standard model says that joint ownership is suboptimal. In this note, we analyze a modi…ed version of the standard model that is tailored to the organization of R&D activities, where one of the parties is wealth-constrained and protected by limited liability. It turns out that joint ownership can be optimal, since it avoids wasteful rent-seeking activities when limited liability rents are necessary to induce high e¤ort. Our results are in line with the fact that R&D activities are often conducted in research joint ventures.
Introduction
The property rights approach to the theory of the …rm based on the incomplete contracting paradigm has been one of the major advances in microeconomics in the past three decades (see Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) . 1 By now, the property rights theory has been successfully applied in various …elds such as industrial organization, international trade, corporate …nance, organizational economics, political economy, and privatization theory.
The starting point of the property rights approach is the observation that ownership allocations correspond to allocations of residual control rights; i.e., the owner has the right to make decisions in circumstances not covered by a prior contract.
A central conclusion of the basic model is that joint ownership (i.e, bilateral veto power) cannot be optimal. However, it has already been emphasized by Holmström (1999) that joint ventures are an important part of the corporate landscape, so the standard prediction that joint ownership cannot be optimal seems to be counterfactual. In particular, in the context of R&D activities, research joint ventures are a prominent organizational form. 2 In the present paper, we present a novel explanation for the optimality of joint ownership. In our model, one of the contractual parties has to exert e¤ort to come up with an innovation. In line with Aghion and Tirole's (1994a,b) management-ofinnovation setup, we suppose that this party has no resources and is protected by limited liability.
Speci…cally, we consider the relationship between a principal (say, a customer) and a wealth-constrained agent (say, a research unit). At the outset, the parties agree on a project, but a complete contract cannot yet be written.
Subsequently, each party can invest e¤ort to come up with modi…cations to 1 The incomplete contracts approach is at the center of Oliver Hart's work, who has recently been awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences together with Bengt Holmström (cf. Nobel Prize Committee, 2016). the project. 3 In line with Hart et al. (1997) , we assume that the owner has the right to decide whether or not a modi…cation is implemented. Finally, the principal o¤ers a contract and the agent exerts unobservable e¤ort, yielding either a successful innovation or a failure. In order to induce the agent to exert high e¤ort, the principal must leave a limited-liability rent to the agent (cf. La¤ont and Martimort, 2002, ch. 4) . 4 The rent depends on the success probability when low e¤ort is exerted, which in turn depends on which mod-i…cation is implemented. When the principal is the owner, she will invest in modi…cations that reduce the agent's rent. When the agent is the owner, he will invest in modi…cations that increase his rent. Under joint ownership, no rent-seeking investments take place, because each party has veto power. Thus, joint ownership may be strictly optimal since it can avoid costly activities to in ‡uence the agent's limited-liability rent.
For example, consider a small wealth-constrained biotechnology …rm and a large pharmaceutical company who want to develop a new combination medicine. Exerting high e¤ort means testing all conceivable combinations, while exerting low e¤ort means that only a few combinations are tested. Given low e¤ort, experienced researchers have a larger success probability than inexperienced researchers, because they have a better intuition about which combinations are most promising. Given high e¤ort, all combinations are tested, so the success probability is independent of whether the researchers are experienced or inexperienced. The owner has the right to make costly changes to the composition of a given research team consisting of both experienced and inexperienced researchers. Our model suggests that such changes will be made under sole ownership by either the biotechnology …rm or the pharmaceutical company, but not in case of a joint venture. Since in equilibrium high e¤ort will be exerted, costly reorganizations of the research team are wasteful rent-seeking activities, so a joint venture is optimal.
Related literature. To the best of my knowledge, the present paper is the …rst one showing that joint ownership can be optimal due to limited liability constraints, which often play a central role in the context of research activities (cf. the "R&D game" in Tirole, 1999, p. 745) . The paper thus contributes to the literature that tries to explain the optimality of joint ownership in situations di¤erent from those studied in the original Grossman-Hart-Moore setup.
For instance, other potential explanations for joint ownership include repeated interactions (Halonen, 2002) , investment spillovers (Rosenkranz and Schmitz, 2003; Gattai and Natale, 2016; Hamada, 2017) , sequential investments (Lülfesmann, 2004), adverse selection (Schmitz, 2006 (Schmitz, , 2008 , and transaction costs (Müller and Schmitz, 2015) . See Gattai and Natale (2017) for a comprehensive survey on explanations for the optimality of joint ownership in various departures from the original setup of the property rights approach to the theory of the …rm.
The model
Consider two risk-neutral parties, an agent A and a principal P , who can work on a project in the future. The agent has no wealth and is protected by limited liability. The reservation utilities are zero. At date 0, an ownership structure o 2 fA; P; Jg is …xed. Moreover, the basic characteristics of the project are speci…ed. In line with the property rights approach to the theory of the …rm, it is not yet possible to write more detailed contracts at date 0.
At date 1, each party i 2 fA; P g can invest e¤ort x i 2 f0; 1g in order to develop modi…cations to the project. Let the disutility of e¤ort be given by Let q = q 0 in the basic version of the project. At date 1, by incurring a disutility of e¤ort k, each party can develop one of two modi…cations. Mod-i…cation I means that the success probability given low e¤ort is increased to q = q H 2 (q 0 ; p). Modi…cation II means that the success probability given low e¤ort is reduced to q = q L 2 (0; q 0 ). For simplicity, we assume that otherwise a modi…ed project is identical to the basic project. It will turn out that the agent can only be interested in developing modi…cation I, while the principal can only be interested in developing modi…cation II.
We assume throughout that R is su¢ciently large, such that at date 3 the principal always o¤ers a contract that induces the agent to exert high e¤ort.
Assumption 1. Suppose that R > pc (p q H ) 2 . 5 The simplifying assumption that one of the parties has all the bargaining power is often made in the related literature (see e.g. Hart and Moore, 1999, p. 119) . It is straightforward to generalize our results to the case in which also the agent has some bargaining power (in analogy to the approach taken in the appendix of Hart and Moore, 1999) .
Optimal ownership
First, consider agent-ownership (o = A). At date 3, the principal o¤ers to make a payment w 1 0 to the agent if there will be a success at date 5, while otherwise the payment will be w 0 0. Note that at date 4 the agent will exert high e¤ort (e = 1) whenever the incentive-compatibility constraint
is satis…ed. The principal's expected date-3 payo¤ is then given by p(R w 1 ) (1 p)w 0 . It is straightforward to show that the principal will always set w 0 = 0. Hence, the principal will o¤er
As a consequence, at date 3 the expected continuation payo¤ of the principal is u P (q) = p R c p q , while the agent's expected continuation payo¤ is
Observe that u P (q) is a decreasing function, while u A (q) is an increasing function. Therefore, if at date 2 modi…cation I is available, it will be implemented by the agent and hence q = q H . Otherwise, the agent will stick to the basic version of the project, q = q 0 . 6 At date 1, the principal will not invest in modi…cations of the project, since only modi…cation I would be implemented by the agent, which would reduce 6 Note that at date 3 the principal will o¤er a contract that induces the agent to exert high e¤ort, so q has no in ‡uence on the expected total surplus that the parties can generate from date 2 on. As a consequence, there is no scope for mutually bene…cial renegotiation.
At date 2, the modi…ed projects yield the same expected surplus as the original project, even though the implications for the agent's rent di¤er.
u P (q). However, the agent will invest in modi…cation I provided that
pc.
Next, consider principal-ownership (o = P ). The analysis of the decisions at dates 3 and 4 remains unchanged. Yet, if at date 2 modi…cation II is available, it will now be implemented by the principal and hence q = q L .
Otherwise, the principal will stick to the basic version of the project, q = q 0 .
Thus, at date 1 the agent will not invest in modi…cations of the project, since only modi…cation II would be implemented by the principal, which would reduce u A (q). The principal will invest in modi…cation II provided that
pc:
Finally, consider joint ownership (o = J). The analysis of dates 3 and 4 remains again unchanged. At date 2, the principal would always veto implementing modi…cation I, while the agent would veto implementing modi…cation II. As a consequence, the parties will stick to the basic version of the project, q = q 0 . For this reason, no party will invest e¤ort in developing modi…cations to the project at date 1.
Let the parties' expected total surplus be denoted by S o . We can now state our main result.
Proposition 1 (i) If k < minf q H q 0 (p q 0 )(p q H ) ; q 0 q L (p q 0 )(p q L ) gpc, then o = J is strictly better than o = A and o = P . Speci…cally, S J = pR c > S A = S P = pR c k. (iv) If k > maxf q H q 0 (p q 0 )(p q H ) ; q 0 q L (p q 0 )(p q L ) gpc, then the ownership structure does not matter, since S A = S P = S J = pR c.
In particular, part (i) of the proposition shows that if the e¤ort costs of coming up with modi…cations to the project are su¢ciently small, then joint ownership is strictly better than both agent-ownership and principal-ownership, which is in contrast to the standard conclusion of the property rights theory.
Intuitively, due to limited liability the principal must leave a rent to the agent in order to implement high e¤ort. When the costs of modifying the project are su¢ciently small, then under P -ownership the principal will invest e¤ort to reduce the agent's rent, while under A-ownership the agent will invest e¤ort to increase his rent. Joint ownership is optimal, since it avoids these wasteful rent-seeking activities.
The role of limited liability
It should be emphasized that our result that joint ownership can strictly outperform A-ownership and P -ownership depends on the assumption that the agent is protected by limited liability. To see this, suppose that there were no wealth constraints, so that payments to the agent could be negative. At date 3, At date 3, the expected continuation payo¤ of the principal is pR c, and the agent's expected continuation payo¤ is zero (i.e., the agent does not get a rent).
These payo¤s do not depend on q, so regardless of the ownership structure no party would ever invest in modi…cations I or II of the project. Therefore, in the absence of limited liability, ownership would not matter in our model. 7 7 One could extend our model by allowing both parties to also make productive investments at date 1, such that in line with the standard Grossman-Hart-Moore setup joint ownership would be strictly suboptimal in the absence of limited liability constraints. In the presence of limited liability, joint ownership would then be optimal if the rent-seeking losses under A-and P -ownership were larger than the welfare gains generated by the productive investments.
Conclusion
In the standard property rights theory, joint ownership is suboptimal. We have considered an R&D setup where the agent is protected by limited liability. The principal and the agent can engage in rent-seeking activities in order to develop modi…cations to the project. Subsequently, the agent exerts unobservable e¤ort to come up with an innovation. It has turned out that joint ownership can be optimal, since it avoids wasteful rent-seeking activities.
